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9/3/2009 [Total Votes: 481, Hits: 704]Print

Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT): A Backgounder
 
Aryaman Bhatnagar
 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was opened for signature in 1968, is a landmark treaty in the field of nuclear disarmament. It is the most widely accepted arms control agreement having three main pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and a right to peaceful use of nuclear energy.
 
As of now only four states have not signed the NPT: India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea. Both India and Pakistan are openly declared nuclear weapon states; Israel follows a policy of nuclear ambiguity regarding its nuclear programme. As for North Korea it had joined the Treaty, and subsequently withdrew from it.
India believes that the NPT is a highly discriminatory Treaty which does not serve the purpose of achieving nuclear disarmament. It is for this reason that India has repeatedly refused to sign the NPT. However, despite being a non-signatory to the Treaty, India has always urged for nuclear disarmament, discouraged horizontal and vertical proliferation and encouraged the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
We will see in the following paragraphs how India has continued to uphold the provisions mentioned in the various articles of the Treaty despite being a non-signatory to it and maintained a nuclear arsenal only to serve its national interests.
 
ARTICLE I
The first article binds the nuclear weapon states from transferring nuclear weapon states or other nuclear explosive devices or the means to produce the same and from encouraging or assisting them to manufacture these on their own.
India is not Party to the NPT, but its conduct in the field of nuclear proliferation has always been consistent with the key provisions of the Treaty which also apply to the nuclear-weapon States. India has always been against nuclear armament and has never encouraged the production of nuclear weapons in any other country nor has it transferred such weapons or the technology or knowledge to do so.
This is in contrast to other nuclear weapon states, who have either been active collaborators in, or silent spectators to, continuing clandestine and illegal proliferation, including export of nuclear weapon components and technology. China had encouraged the nuclear programmes of North Korea and Pakistan. The USA has been an all weather ally of Israel, despite the latter’s nuclear programme and has put no pressure on it to sign the NPT or give up its nuclear arsenal. Moreover, the Sino-Pakistani nuclear weapons collaboration is a clear violation of the NPT, highlighting the fact that the non-proliferation regime in India’s neighbourhood has collapsed.
 
Other nuclear weapon states not party to the NPT, besides Israel, are Pakistan and North Korea. Unlike, India they don’t have an impeccable record in discouraging nuclear proliferation. Pakistani nuclear scientist, AQ Khan was alleged to have traded nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea, while North Korea herself has recently been accused of assisting the Syrian military nuclear programme.
 
ARTICLE II
The second article binds the non-nuclear weapon states from receiving any transfer or seeking assistance to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and from manufacturing these weapons on their own.
 
ARTICLE III
The third article has four sub-clauses:
1) The non-nuclear weapon states undertake to accept the IAEA safeguards with the purpose of verification that the nuclear energy is being used for peaceful purposes and has not been diverted to the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The safeguards would be applicable to all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such state, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere.
2) Each party state undertakes not to provide fissionable material or the equipment or material designed to process, use or produce fissionable material to any non-nuclear weapon state for peaceful purposes unless the material is subject to IAEA verifications.
3) The safeguards will be implemented in a manner which does not hamper the economic or technological development of the other parties or the international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities.
4) Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the treaty shall conclude agreements with the IAEA within 180 days from the original entry into force if the treaty in accordance with the IAEA statute. States which deposit their instruments of ratification after the 180-day period, the negotiations will commence not later than the day of deposit.
Despite, not having signed the NPT, India is a member of the UN watchdog, the IAEA. It has put 4 of its 13 reactors under IAEA safeguards having clearing distinguished between civilian power plants and military power plants. By adopting this policy it has been be open about its military nuclear programme and clearing distinguished it from its civil nuclear programme. This highlights the basic tenets of India’s nuclear policy, which is committed to upholding the national security of the country and at the same time is seeking to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. With the conclusion of the Indo-US nuclear deal, India has voluntarily placed 14 of its 22 reactors under IAEA safeguards and has signed an umbrella to place all the rectors under safeguards.
 
ARTICLE IV
 
This article has two sub clauses:
 
1) The treaty does not prohibit the development of research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful uses by all Parties to the treaty.
2) All the Parties to the treaty have the right to undertake the facilitation or to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The states in the capacity to do should also participate in the full development of the potential of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
 
India has developed a comprehensive indigenous infrastructure and a pool of skilled manpower in the nuclear sector, to meet its energy requirements as well as to enhance its national security. Realizing the importance of nuclear energy as a clean and cheap source of energy, India has placed considerable importance on nuclear energy in its energy mix. Such energy would not only help in meeting the concerns arising out of green house gas emissions but will also help in bringing greater prosperity to a larger number of people. It is for this reason that India has continued on the path of indigenous development of its civil nuclear programme and at the same time stressed on greater international cooperation in the field which is reflected in its nuclear deal with USA.
 
ARTICLE V
 
Parties undertake to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear weapon states at a low cost which would exclude any charge for research and development.
 
Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the treat will be able to obtain such benefits, after bilateral or multilateral agreements through an international body having adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States.
 
ARTICLE VI
 
Parties to the treaty undertake to commence negotiations on measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear armamanent at an early date and to bring about a treaty on general and complete disarmament.
 
This article reflects the hypocritical and discriminatory nature of the treaty. While, the non-nuclear weapon states are persuaded from developing nuclear weapons, there is no time-bound framework for the nuclear weapon states to give up their nuclear arsenal.
 
India is perhaps the only nuclear weapon state which has called for complete nuclear disarmament. India was the first country to call for a ban on nuclear testing in 1954, for a non-discriminatory treaty on non-proliferation in 1965, non-use of nuclear weapons in 1978, for a nuclear freeze in 1982 and for a phased programme of for complete elimination of nuclear weapons in 1988. It is committed to commencing a Nuclear Weapons convention along the lines of a CWC, which will help in achieving this end. India maintains a nuclear arsenal in the interest of national security but exercises its nuclear might with utmost restraint; having declared a no-first-use policy and non-use against non-nuclear weapon states providing negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon states.
 
ARTICLE VII
 
The treaty does not prohibit the rights of any group of states to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in that particular region.
 
While, the establishment of a NWFZ may be possible in a region like Southeast Asia, Africa or Latin America, the establishment of a similar zone in the Indian subcontinent is virtually impossible given the current political and military situation. India is in favour of global and complete nuclear disarmament. India’s reason behind going nuclear has always been rooted in its desire to protect its own security. So despite the fact that India may be interested in nuclear disarmament, being surrounded by nuclear weapons armed China and Pakistan who are not willing to disarm their nuclear arsenal, it is considered more desirable to retain their nuclear weaponry till the other nuclear powers in the region show any signs of disarming.
 
Moreover, given the fact that the Chinese and Pakistani nuclear programmes are uranium-based, it may become difficult for the IAEA officials to inspect any clandestine operation as it is very easy to disclose such reactors given their size. In the light of the above arguments, it seems highly unlikely that a NWFZ would be successful in the region.
 
ARTICLE VIII
 
This article has three sub clauses:
 
1) Any Party to the Treaty has the right to propose amendments, the text of which will submitted by the depositary government to the other Parties. If requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties, a conference will be convened to consider such an amendment.
2) Any amendment has to be approved by a majority of votes, including the votes of all the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties, which on that date are members of the board of governors of the IAEA. The amendment will enter into force after a majority of Party States have submitted their instruments of ratification, including the votes of all the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties, which on that date are members of the board of governors of the IAEA
3) A review conference of the Treaty will be held in Geneva five years after the entry into force of this Treaty. A majority of the Parties can obtain the convening of further such conferences, at intervals of five years thereafter, by submitting a proposal to the depositary governments.
 
ARTICLE IX
 
This article has six sub clauses:
 
1) The treaty is open to all states for signature.
2) The treaty will be subject to ratification by signatory states and instruments of ratification and instruments of accession will be deposited with the Governments of USA, UK and USSR, which are designated as the Depositary Governments.
3) This treaty will enter into force after its ratification by 43 countries, including the three Depositary Governments. The treaty declares a nuclear-weapon State to be one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive devices prior to January 1, 1967.
4) States which ratify the treaty after it has already come into force; the Treaty for them will enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5) Depositary Governments have the responsibility of informing each Party the date each signature, deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession and the date for entry into force of the treaty.
6) This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
 
India maintained its lack of intention to sign the NPT even in 1997, when it voted against the paragraph of the UNGA Resolution which called upon all non-Party States to accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible date. India continues to stress that it will not become Party to the treaty till it lays down a comprehensive and time-bound framework for disarmament by the nuclear weapon states.
 
Another reason why India has continued to refuse to sign the NPT is reflected in the statement of clause three of this article. If it signs the NPT, it would have to become Party to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State as it became a nuclear power only in 1974, while countries like China, among other nuclear-weapon States, will continue to hold on to its nuclear arsenal.
 
ARTICLE X
This article has two sub clauses:
1) Each Party has the right to withdraw from the treaty after a three month notice. The notice will have to be submitted to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the UNSC and should include a statement of the events it regards as having jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.
2) A conference will be held twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty to decide whether the treaty should continue indefinitely or for additional fixed periods of time.
 
Aryaman Bhatnagar is a Research Intern at the Indian Pugwash Society. He can be contacted at aryaman.bhatnagar@gmail.com
 

 

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