Prevent to Pre-empt? Targeting Nuclear Facilities
S. Samuel C. Rajiv
The debates about the possibility of Israeli military strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and concerns expressed about the safety and security of Pakistani nuclear assets has brought to the fore security dilemmas related to strategic technologies. The pursuit of such technologies is seen to endow adversaries with capabilities that could irrevocably tilt the balance of power. Targeting an enemy’s strategic assets during periods of war and conflict is considered essential and legitimate, to the extent that such actions fulfill the political objectives guiding the use of force (flowing from the Clausewitzian dictum that war is an extension of politics by other means). The allied air attack on the German missile development centre at Peenemunde in August 1943 is a case in point.
Such punitive steps undertaken to remove a possible future threat or the imminent use of a particular asset are military actions that are explained under the rubric of the doctrines of ‘prevention’ and ‘pre-emption’ respectively. Eminent war theoretician Lawrence Freedman calls these twin categories as ‘controlling strategies’ which assume that an adversary will use force given an opportunity to do so and therefore has to be denied that option. These strategies are in contrast to a doctrine of deterrence, a ‘coercive’ strategy which assumes that an adversary’s behaviour can be influenced in ways which can be managed.
Any nation-state undertaking one of the ‘controlling’ strategies will have to calculate that the benefits accrued from such actions actually exceed the costs of inaction and the resultant dangers that could result from that particular enemy activity. This is inherently a difficult exercise, more so in peacetime (defined as lack of armed conflict), given the veil of secrecy and the resultant paucity of information surrounding such ‘strategic technology’ programmes, judgments as to the drivers behind that programme, and the intentions of that state in using capabilities so developed to hurt ones strategic interests.
Israel’s Iran Dilemma
Israel has been very vocal about the dangers posed by a nuclear Iran for its existential security. Among reasons driving its concerns include the nature of the Iranian regime (theocratic and allegedly millennial); the hurdles in establishing a deterrence relationship with Tehran given the lack of any formal communication channels, coupled with a period of antagonism in their bilateral relationship stretching back at least 3 decades; avowed hatred towards its very existence as exemplified by past statements of its top leadership; and support for groups like the Hezbollah and Hamas, which have waged wars of attrition along its borders or which are held to constitute a security threat.
Jerusalem has accordingly mounted a vigorous diplomatic campaign to convince the world (specifically the United States) of the need to act urgently to contain and remove this threat. Reports however suggest that Washington has been a reluctant partner is supporting a possible Israeli attempt to take out the source of that alleged threat – the Iranian nuclear facilities, by military means. This is attributed to a host of factors, including the American presence in Iraq and the odds against a military strike to effectively destroy the widely dispersed and hardened, underground, well-protected facilities deep inside Iranian territory. The inherent complications involved in undertaking such an activity thousands of kilometers away from its borders – either by aircraft or missiles, has also been another limiting factor for Israel to consider.
Past History
Israel of course has a history of undertaking ‘daring’ military activities away from its borders to address security concerns or secure its interests. ‘Operation Thunderbolt’ (rescue of Israeli hostages of an Air France plane at the Entebbe airport in Uganda in 1976), ‘Operation Opera’ (June 1981 strike on the Osiraq nuclear reactor in Iraq), and ‘Operation Orchad’ (September 2007 strike on the al-Kibar Syrian ‘nuclear’ facility allegedly being built with North Korean assistance), are prominent examples.
Nascent Capabilities More Vulnerable
There have been instances of countries other than Israel targeting nuclear facilities. Bennet Ramberg in an article in Arms Control Today (May 2008) examining the radiological consequences of a possible attack on the Israeli reactor at Dimona, lists these examples. These include Iran targeting Osiraq (1980); Iraq attacking partially finished Iranian reactors at Bushehr, during the Iran-Iraq war; the US bombing Iraqi research reactor at Tuwaitha in 1991; and Saddam Hussein launching Scud missiles against Dimona during the Persian Gulf War.
The above instances suggest that nascent facilities are more vulnerable to be neutralised successfully by punitive actions. A similar narrative also played out in the case of the Chinese nuclear quest. The US and Soviet Union considered taking out these facilities in the 1960’s when Beijing had not yet developed the full capacities of its nuclear arsenal. They could not do so for various reasons, including reported US opposition to a possible move from Moscow to carry out such an attack in 1969. The nuclear history of the established nuclear powers, as well as India and Pakistan suggests that once these technologies get matured and countries are endowed with the resultant strategic capabilities due to the success of these efforts, their adversaries do not find it worthwhile to take out these facilities but instead take steps to face the altered strategic reality.
The India-Pakistan Scenario: ‘Rumours’ about Kahuta
In the aftermath of the 1981 Israeli strike on Osiraq, unconfirmed reports suggested that India was supportive of an Israeli plan to attack the Pakistani reactor at Kahuta. Scholarship dealing with the nuclear dynamics of the sub-continent, including by George Perkovich, Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark among others, note these instances and point out that such an attack was possibly not carried out for a variety of reasons. These included the dangers of a Pakistani counter-strike on Trombay and the radiological consequences of a successful attack given the massive population density of the region; and possible US opposition to the move, concerned as it was with the situation in Afghanistan.
India and Pakistan have of course put in place agreements against targeting each others nuclear facilities. The Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities was signed on December 1988 and both countries have exchanged lists of their respective nuclear facilities every year since 1992. These confidence-building measures have proved to be successful in preventing any untoward incident between the nuclear armed sub-continental rivals, though in the aftermath of the Indian nuclear tests in May 1998, the Pakistani Ambassador to the UN alleged (in an interview with the CNN) that New Delhi was planning to attack its nuclear sites, a charge that was denied.
‘Renaissance’ of Nuclear Power
There has been a spurt in the growth of (and interest in) nuclear power worldwide, most of it concentrated in the vulnerable regions of Asia – including in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Given that these regions have huge security deficits, the dual-use nature of such strategic technologies may lead to existential security dilemmas. Addressing them is easier said than done, given that some of such pursuits may in fact be geared towards developing the security hedge provided by these technologies. For instance, Egypt’s Ambassador to the US Nabil Fahmy in April 2007 stated that there would be “greater proliferation in the region” if the security motivations behind Iran’s behaviour were not addressed.
A Legal Cover?
Iran on August 12, 2009 stated that it would pursue efforts to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution (passed in September 1990) prohibiting armed attacks against nuclear facilities. The efficacy of such top-down approaches, which are difficult to implement and enforce, is open to question. The US action on an Iraqi reactor in 1991 and the Israeli attack on the Syrian ‘reactor’ in 2007 suggest that such resolutions are not limiting factors. Further, non-state actors like the al-Qaeda may not in any way be constrained by them.
Better Technology, Devaluing role of nuclear weapons, CBMs, Political Solutions
In order to deal with the threat from non-state actors, more robust perimeter security, strong air defence systems, better technology ensuring the safety of nuclear devices (like permissive action links), a de-mated posture (separation of warheads from the delivery systems), among other relevant procedures and measures will go a long way towards ensuring that the dangers of theft or mis-use/accidental use is limited.
Continued efforts need to be made to develop better technology (proliferation-resistant nuclear power reactors); de-legitimise and de-value the role of nuclear weapons so as to make them not attractive to other nations; confidence-building-measures (CBM’s), as those that exist between India and Pakistan; among other relevant measures. But if two sides do not see eye to eye and do not even talk to each other (Israel and Iran), things can get a lot more complicated for the comfort of those involved, compounded by trust deficits, ideological hatreds and regime insecurities.
Just as the laws of physics do not seem to hold at the event horizon of a black hole, the Clausewitzian dictum begins to lose its relevance in the nuclear age. No political goal can justify the use of weapons that could result in the death and destruction of hundreds and thousands of people. As long as Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) continue to place nuclear weapons at the centre of their security universe, and do not begin to take commitments made under Article VI of the NPT more seriously (under which they pledged to undertake effective disarmament measures), other states will continue to pursue efforts to obtain such strategic technologies for themselves. And efforts by states threatened by such pursuits (whether real or perceived) to act to prevent such efforts will play out to as yet undefined but dangerous ends.
The author is a researcher specializing in nuclear and Middle East issues at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi and a resource person at the Indian Pugwash Society.
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Asian Nuclear, Missile & Space Digest - Vol 1, No. 34
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