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4/8/2008 [Total Votes: 1000, Hits: 2185]Print

ARUN VISHWANATHAN

The North Korean denuclearisation process is gathering steam. There have been several rounds of inspections of Pyongyang's facilities by joint American, Chinese and Russian team of experts. It is widely expected that North Korea would lay out elements of a draft declaration in which it would detail all its nuclear activities.¹ Speculation has been rife over what the North would or would not include in the declaration.² There have been reports that the denuclearisation process would take till February 2008.³

Here, it would be proper to state - without doing any crystal gazing on the contents of the North Korean declaration - that the denuclearisation process should ensure a couple of things. Firstly, it should ensure that the North Korean regime is not able to re-start its nuclear activities easily post disablement. In order to achieve this, it is imperative that the parties to the Six-Party talks sit down and discuss threadbare what the term 'disablement' actually means. Effective and verifiable disablement is only possible if common definitions are arrived at. Secondly, the process should assist inspectors in accurately verifying North Korea Plutonium declaration.

What does 'Disablement' mean?

Disablement is a word that has crept into the language of the Six-Party talks since it was used by Scott McClellan, the former White House press secretary.⁴ In the absence of a more acceptable term, disablement became something of a convenience. There is a general agreement that the current phase is a difficult one. As Christopher Hill put it, the Six-Party talks have reached a point where "they have not been before, beyond just shutting down the facilities."⁵ In such situations of advanced and complex diplomatic negotiations, terminology become quite important. This is a fact which negotiators to the Six-Party talks have come to realise of late. Christopher Hill pointed this out when he talked about the need to come up with common definitions, "so that we are satisfied when they say they are disabling, we know what they're doing and we agree that it's disablement."⁶

However, puzzling over terminologies is not going to get us anywhere on dismantling North Korean facilities. The task before the international community is to effectively dismantle the North Korean facilities in a manner which allows verification and forensic activities. In August 2007 some ideas were also throw up at the meeting of the denuclearisation group at Shengyang. In the last couple of months, experts from US, Russia and China have visited the North Korean nuclear complex at Yongbyon several times. The US chief nuclear negotiator, Ambassador Christopher Hill also visited the Yongbyong facilities recently.⁷ The inspections and other such future visits are important as they enable experts to adapt the ideas thrown up to suit the actual equipment present in North Korean facilities.

There are several ideas floating around which range from disabling control rods, to cutting the drive chains, to disabling/destroying the fuel rod handling machines, to completely entombing the reactor by pouring cement into it. The US Department of Energy (DoE) had released a document in March 2006 which talks about disabling a reactor.⁸ This could be a pointer to things to come.

The DoE document recommends a phased approach at disabling a nuclear reactor. The initial step could take the form of disabling control rods in the reactor pile. This step is simple enough to implement and is nevertheless a sure shot way of ensuring that the reactor cannot be restarted. Selective inserting or removing control rods in a reactor is what allows the operator to control the power output of the reactor. Therefore, once all the control rods are inserted in the reactor and the mechanism which allows the operator to move the rods is disabled, the reactor automatically shuts down and also does not allow restarting of the reactor. Though the drive mechanism is reactor-dependant, one can ensure by cutting the drive chains that the control rods cannot be removed from the reactor core. However, a better option would be to either weld the control rods in place to ensure that they do not slide out inadvertently due to an earthquake or to remove them from the reactor core.

Given the current state of play, it is apparent that the parties to the North Korea disablement programme have chosen the option of unloading fuel rods. Statements indicate that most of the disablement work has progressed as per schedule. The delay is only on account of fulfilment of all safety procedures. On 8 January 2008, during his visit to South Korea Ambassador Christopher Hill, the US top nuclear envoy expressed his satisfaction with regard to the disablement process. He said that some technical and safety issues were holding up the process.⁹ Similarly, the South Korean top nuclear envoy recently said that "Most of the disabling work, except for the removal of the nuclear fuel rods from the reactor, is expected to be completed this year." He reiterated that a lot of preparation is needed to remove the fuel rods.¹⁰

However, unloading the fuel rods moves them a step closer to being reprocessed. To make matters more complicated, the fuel rods once unloaded would have to be transferred to a cooling pond where they would have to be left for about two months or more before it would be safe for anyone to handle them.

This leads to another issue of preparing the cooling pond where the fuel rods will have to be stored. Reports have indicated the current techniques adopted by North Korea to prepare the cooling pond are far from satisfactory. In the past, North Korea has used regular water (H₂O) to store the fuel rods.¹¹ However, such storage is far from satisfactory as it leads to corrosion of fuel rods. If one wants to store Magnesium Alloy Graphite Moderated Gas Cooled Uranium Oxide Reactor (MAGNOX) fuel for upto five years, the desirable pH (measure of acidity or alkalinity) level should be about 11.5. Secondly, the water should contain less than 1 parts per million (ppm) of chlorides and less than 4 parts per million (ppm) of sulphates.¹²

Considering the issue of storage of the unloaded fuel rods, a recent South Korean proposal assumes significance. Seoul has recently said that it is considering using the North Korean fuel rods to power its nuclear power plants.¹³ If this proposal flies, then it would resolve the thorny issue of storing the unloaded fuel rods. Factoring in a schedule of about two months for unloading the fuel rods and another two to three months for them to cool down, it can be expected that the fuel rods would be ready to be transported out of North Korea only after April 2008.

As the DoE document mentions, the unloading of the fuel rods could be followed up by flushing the reactor core and the gas cooling system with Boron and/or Iridium.¹⁴ As both these are neutron absorbers, they would make any attempt to restart the reactor very difficult if not impossible. This step can be followed up by "additional disablement functions" which could include disabling the cooling tower, and "after verification and nuclear forensics are complete" dismantling or permanently entombing the reactor pile. Each step in such a phased approach would be more severe and would naturally make it harder for the facility operators to restart operations, culminating in complete and irreversible disablement of the plant.

Verifying the North Korean declaration - the ultimate test

Without doubt, the hardest stage of the North Korean denuclearisation process is still to come. The real test of Pyongyang's and the international community's commitment to the process is the North Korean declaration of past nuclear activities and its subsequent verification. There are two issues that the international community has to tackle: first, the issue of verifying the North Korean plutonium stock whether separated or otherwise; the second and the more complex issue is the alleged centrifuge enrichment programme.

Verifying Plutonium declaration

North Korea has been accumulating plutonium since 1986. However, between 1994 and 2003, as part of its commitment under the Agreed Framework, it 'froze' its plutonium production programme. Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea shut down, but maintained its 5MWe reactor at Yongbyon (which was its main source of plutonium) as well as its nearby plutonium separation plant, and the Radiochemical Laboratory. Albright and Brannan have estimated that as of February 2007, North Korea has a total estimated plutonium stock of between 46 and 64 kilograms of plutonium of which 28-50 kilograms are estimated to have been separated and thus usable in nuclear weapons.¹⁵ If one assumes that a nuclear weapon contains about 4-5 kilograms of plutonium, Pyongyang's estimated stock of separated plutonium would be enough for between 5 and 12 weapons.

What is most important in this process is to make sure that Pyongyang doesn't have a hidden stockpile of plutonium. This can be estimated by calculating the amount of plutonium produced by North Korea and comparing it to the current plutonium holdings that North Korea possesses. Here one would have to factor in the amount of plutonium used in the North Korean nuclear test. However, there are sources for error.

James Acton writing at the Arms Control Wonk points to four possible sources of error.¹⁶ The first he notes is the uncertainty in the amount of plutonium produced in the 40MW reactor at Yongbyon. Second, the uncertainty regarding the quantity of plutonium lost during reprocessing. Experts mention that even the most rudimentary reprocessing plants are quite efficient and thus estimate that 95 ± 2% is a fair guess. However, the North Koreans have previously claimed that they lost as much as 30% during reprocessing.¹⁷ The third possible source of error is the uncertainty in the amount of plutonium used in the test. One can safely assume that the North Korean used 4 - 7 kilograms of plutonium for the test. The fourth source of error is the uncertainty in the quantity of plutonium that is/will be in the spent fuel pond at Yongbyon. Albright and Brannan estimate this figure to be as 11.5 ±1.5 kilograms.¹⁸ Thus, the total upper limit for error (and thereby the size of a secret North Korean plutonium stockpile) is about 10 kilograms.¹⁹

However, this error can be significantly reduced if the North Korean regime allows the inspectors to take samples from the reactor's graphite moderator for analysis then the amount of plutonium produced in the reactor can be estimated to within about 2.5% using a technique called (Graphite Isotopic Ratio Method) GIRM.²⁰ This would allow the inspectors to put an upper limit of about 3 kilogram on the size of any secret North Korean plutonium stockpile (a number which the international community could probably live with). However, whether this access is granted or not is another matter altogether.

Alleged Centrifuge Enrichment Programme

The North Korean alleged centrifuge enrichment programme is one of the most difficult issues that the parties to the North Korean denuclearisation are posed with. The issue assumes significance because it was this that had brought down the 1994 Agreed Framework. The US charge had been that Pyongyang was building a large-scale centrifuge plant. Recently, Michael Green the former senior director for Asia on the National Security Council, wrote in Newsweek International that "Pyongyang has still refused to acknowledge the existence of its HEU program, which violates all previous commitments and could produce dozens of bombs once operational. If North Korea does not include the program on its list of nuclear facilities to be dismantled, the deal cannot move forward."²¹ The point to be noted is that this assessment seems to have been reached by the US intelligence community on the basis of the North Korean procurement of thousands of aluminium tubes. This is reminiscent of the CIA's charge on the basis of the high strength aluminium tubes that Iraq was building a large scale centrifuge plant.

The above assessment should not be taken to mean that the North Korean regime did not attempt a centrifuge plant. There is ample evidence to prove that North Korea did in fact acquire equipment and centrifuges to put together a small-scale centrifuge plant. In face of Pyongyang's contention that it had never intended to produce Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Ambassador Hill recently pointed out that the US possesses evidence to prove otherwise.²² However, there is a world of difference between putting together a small-scale centrifuge program involving a few dozen centrifuges and building and operating a comprehensive, large-scale production plant involving the manufacture of thousands of complete centrifuges.²³

A denial by North Korea about its centrifuge enrichment programme would only jeopardise whatever progress has been made and would play into that hands of the US hardliners. However, even the US intelligence community should base its assessment on more concrete evidence and not merely on the strength and number of aluminium tubes.

Conclusion

There are several positives which can be noted in the North Korean denuclearisation process. One such positive is the recent personal letter written by US President Bush to the North Korean leader Kim Jong Il.²⁴ The letter was a pointer to the fact that the Bush administration's policy towards North Korea had come a long way from the days of branding Pyongyang as part of the "axis of evil."

Though one can be optimistic about the success of the denuclearisation programme, it is important to remember that the North Korean regime has a history of never keeping its promises. To save the current initiative from such a fate, care should be taken while dismantling North Korean facilities that the initial steps do not create a situation where verification and forensic activities are not possible. Thus, it is crucial that the experts who are engaged with the task of disablement of the North Korean facilities do not get affected by the overzealousness of their political masters to score a diplomatic victory on the issue.

(The author is an Associate Fellow with the Indian Pugwash Society, New Delhi. He can be reached at arun_summerhill@yahoo.com)

End Notes:

[1]. "Remarks upon arriving in Japan - Ambassador Hill," State Department, 28 November 2007, available at http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2007/95801.htm

[2]. "N. Korea could declare weaponized plutonium," Brietbart, 25 November 2007, available at
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D8T523CG0&show_article=1

[3]. "Report: Disabling North Korean reactor delayed until February over technical issues," International Herald Tribune, 2 December 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/12/02/asia/AS-GEN-Koreas-Nuclear.php

[4]. "Press Gaggle by Scott McClellan," 23 June 2004, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040623-14.html#nokorea

[5]. Anita Chang, "Talks resume on Disarming North Korea," Washington Post, 16 August 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/16/AR2007081602239.html

[6]. Anita Chang, "Talks resume on Disarming North Korea," Washington Post, 16 August 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/16/AR2007081602239.html

[7]. "Christopher Hill visits Yongbyon nuke reactor," People's Daily, 5 December 2007, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90777/90853/6315102.html

[8]. "On the Issue of Initial Disablement Activities at a Reactor," Department of Energy, available at http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1633/www.armscontrolwonk.com/file_download/77

[9]. Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs: Comments Upon Arrival in South Korea," January 8, 2008, at htttp://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2008/01/98871.htm

[10]. "Seoul offers to use North Korean nuclear fuel rods: report," Energy Daily, 2 December 2007, available at
http://www.energy-daily.com/reports/Seoul_offers_to_use_North_Korean_nuclear_fuel_rods_report_999.html

[11]. David Albright, North Korea's Corroding Fuel, Institute for Science and International Security, August 1994, available at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/ir080194.html

[12]. Further Analysis of Extended Storage of Spent Fuel, IAEA-TECDOC-944, IAEA, Vienna, 1997, pg. 17

[13]. "Seoul considers importing N. Korean nuclear fuel rods: official," Korea Net, 2 December 2007, available at http://www.korea.net/News/News/NewsView.asp?serial_no=20071202003

[14]. "On the Issue of Initial Disablement Activities at a Reactor," Department of Energy, available at http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1633/www.armscontrolwonk.com/file_download/77

[15]. David Albright and Paul Brannan, "The North Korean Plutonium Stock," Institute for Science and International Security, 20 February 2007, pg. 1, available at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/DPRKplutoniumFEB.pdf

[16]. James Acton, "Can We Verify NORK Pu Declaration?" Arms Control Wonk, 7 December 2007, available at http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1727/verification-in-north-korea-will-it-be-good-enough

[17]. David Albright and Kevin O'Neil, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle, Washington, ISIS Press, 2000, pg. 88

[18]. David Albright and Paul Brannan, "The North Korean Plutonium Stock," Institute for Science and International Security, 20 February 2007, pg. 1, available at http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/DPRKplutoniumFEB.pdf

[19]. James Acton, "Can We Verify NORK Pu Declaration?" Arms Control Wonk, 7 December 2007, available at http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/1727/verification-in-north-korea-will-it-be-good-enough

[20]. C.J. Jesh, "A Graphite Isotope Ratio Method Primer-A Method for Estimating Plutonium Production in Graphite Moderated Reactors," Pacific Nortwest National Laboratory, February 2004, available at
http://www.pnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-14568.pdf

[21]. Michael Green statement quoted in David Albright, "North Korea's Alleged Large-Scale Enrichment Plant: Yet Another Questionable Extrapolation Based on Aluminum Tubes," 23 February 2007, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), available at
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/DPRKenrichment22Feb.pdf

[22]. Glenn Kessler, "N. Korea Offers Evidence to Rebut Uranium Claims," Washington Post, 10 November 2007, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/09/AR2007110902364.htm

[23]. David Albright, "North Korea's Alleged Large-Scale Enrichment Plant: Yet Another Questionable Extrapolation Based on Aluminum Tubes," 23 February 2007, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), available at
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/DPRKenrichment22Feb.pdf

[24]. "Bush sends letter to North Korea," BBC, 6 December 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/7130528.stm

Related Tags:

White House Press Secretary, North Korean Denuclearisation Process, North Korean Nuclear Activities, Disablement, Scott McClellan, Dismantling North Korean Facilities, Denuclearisation Group, North Korean Nuclear Complex, US Chief Nuclear Negotiator, US Department of Energy, Disabling a Nuclear Reactor, Unloading Fuel Rods, Regular Water, Magnesium Alloy Graphite Moderated Gas Cooled Uranium Oxide Reactor, MAGNOX, Centrifuge Enrichment Programme, Radiochemical Laboratory, North Korean Nuclear Test, North Korean Plutonium Stockpile, National Security Council, Centrifuge Plant, Highly Enriched Uranium

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